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ANTITRUST AND REGULATING BIG DATA 
D. Daniel Sokol* & Roisin Comerford**  
INTRODUCTION 
The collection of user data online has seen enormous growth in recent 
years. Consumers have benefitted from this growth through an increase in 
free or heavily subsidized services, better quality offerings, and rapid inno-
vation. At the same time, the debate about Big Data, and what it really 
means for consumers and competition, has grown louder. Many have fo-
cused on whether Big Data even presents an antitrust issue, and whether 
and how harms resulting from Big Data should be analyzed and remedied 
under the antitrust laws. The academic literature, however, has somewhat 
lagged behind the policy debate, and a closer inspection of existing schol-
arly works reveals a dearth of thorough study of the issue. Commentators 
generally are split into two camps: one in favor of more proactive antitrust 
enforcement in the Big Data realm, and one opposing such intervention, 
considering antitrust inappropriate for regulation of Big Data. The academic 
case for the former has not, as yet, been fully developed, and is relatively 
light at present. Meanwhile, policy-focused work by academics and practi-
tioners in this arena suggests that antitrust intervention in Big Data would 
be premature and misguided, especially considering the myriad pro-
competitive benefits offered by Big Data. 
This article reviews the scholarly work on the implications of Big Data 
on competition, and considers the potential role of antitrust in the regulation 
of Big Data. Part I provides an overview of the scarce, academic literature 
specifically addressing the role of antitrust in Big Data issues. Parts II and 
III delve into the policy issues surrounding Big Data and whether it poses a 
risk to competition that warrants antitrust intervention. Part II details the 
ways in which Big Data may prove pro-competitive while Part III reviews 
and critiques the suggested potential harms to competition from Big Data. 
Part IV discusses the suitability of antitrust as the institutional choice for 
Big Data issues, and Part V concludes that, at present, antitrust is ill suited 
as the institutional choice. Further, the scholarly case for such harm has not 
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yet been adequately established. Overall, this Article finds much noise as to 
potential “problems” around whether current antitrust tools and policy are 
adequate to deal with a Big Data “challenge.” In reality, there is no chal-
lenge at all, as the arguments for antitrust intervention when Big Data has 
come up as an issue have never carried the day for any merger or decided 
conduct case in any Department of Justice Antitrust Division (“DOJ”), Fed-
eral Trade Commission (“FTC”) or Directorate-General for Competition 
(“DG Competition”) case to date. 
I. EXISTING ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
A review of the academic literature addressing the intersection of Big 
Data and antitrust law reveals relatively few articles on the topic.1 Scholars 
have yet to conduct an in-depth analysis of why Big Data issues are antitrust 
issues, and if so, how they may be best addressed by the antitrust laws as 
opposed to the consumer protection laws.2 Work to-date suggests instead 
that while antitrust and consumer protection laws are complementary, they 
still comprise distinct areas of law, and consumer protection remains the 
correct institutional choice to address potential Big Data harms. “Big is 
bad” has been a bogeyman of antitrust since the time of Standard Oil.3 
However, bigness is not an antitrust offense. Rather, antitrust focuses on 
consumer welfare loss and there has not been a decided merger or a liti-
gated conduct decision that has said otherwise for at least a generation.  
Arguably the most comprehensive contribution to the academic debate 
on the topic of Big Data and competition is an article by Ohlhausen and 
Okuliar.4 Ohlhausen and Okuliar present a three-part framework for analyz-
ing Big Data concerns. First, they focus on the character of the harm—
  
 1 See generally Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Online Advertising, in 81 ADVANCES IN 
COMPUTERS, 289 (Marvin V. Zelkowitz ed., 1st ed. 2011) (providing a summary and literature review of 
Big Data concerns); David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and 
Privacy, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 38 (2009). Much of the scholarly work to date on two-sided online 
markets traces back to work by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole. See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet & 
Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N, 990, 993 (2003); Jean-
Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics of Payment Card 
Associations, 33 RAND J. ECON. 549, 549 (2002). For an overview of the two sided market literature, see 
David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses, in 1 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 407, 408–10 (Roger D. Blair & D. 
Daniel Sokol, eds. 2015).  
 2 For an overall analysis of how economics can better explain empirics in the age of Big Data, 
see Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Economics in the Age of Big Data, 346 SCIENCE 1243089, 1243089-
1 (2014) (providing a literature review and analysis); Hal R. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econo-
metrics, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2014) (analyzing the uses of big data in economics).  
 3 Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 439 (2012). 
 4 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and 
The Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 123 (2015). 
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whether it is commercial, personal, or otherwise.5 They conclude that where 
there is harm to consumer welfare or to economic efficiency, antitrust 
should prevail over consumer protection law as a matter of institutional 
choice.6 Second, they examine the nature of the relationship between the 
user and the data collector, and determine that issues arising from the bar-
gain between a firm and an individual consumer are more likely to fall 
within the realm of consumer protection law than antitrust.7 Third, they 
consider the nature of available remedies and their presumed efficiency in 
resolving particular violations.8 Ultimately, the authors advise that trying to 
fit consumer protection concerns within the antitrust framework is “unnec-
essary,” “could lead to confusion and doctrinal issues in antitrust,” and 
would not afford “true gains to consumer protection.”9 Ohlhausen and 
Okuliar also note four important features of Big Data that caution against an 
antitrust application over consumer protection law, which are explored in 
more detail in Part IV of this article below. First, Big Data creates effi-
ciency gains.10 Second, an antitrust institutional choice would increase sub-
jectivity into antitrust analysis.11 Third, using antitrust would create oppor-
tunities for strategic gaming by firms of the legal system.12 Finally, Ohl-
hausen and Okuliar warn that using an antitrust lens may threaten innova-
tion for new products and services.13 
James Cooper echoes that antitrust law is an inappropriate tool to regu-
late Big Data. He writes: 
The problem with contentions that antitrust laws should directly consider how conduct af-
fects privacy, irrespective of competitive effects, can be addressed rather easily. Absent 
amendment of the antitrust laws or serious departure from stare decisis, courts are unlikely to 
accommodate privacy effects in an antitrust analysis . . . . Further, even if one were to accept 
the analogy between enhanced personal data collection and prices (or equivalently, lower qual-
ity) at face value, there is nothing in the antitrust laws to prevent a firm from unilaterally en-
gaging in this conduct. Antitrust’s longstanding aversion to price regulation means that a legal 
monopolist is free to charge whatever price the market will bear.14 
Cooper also suggests that privacy in Big Data as an antitrust concern would 
raise certain First Amendment issues, as well as muddle the goal of en-
  
 5 Id. at 153–54. 
 6 Id. at 154. 
 7 Id. at 154–55. 
 8 Id. at 155–56. 
 9 Id. at 138.  
 10 Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 4, at 151. 
 11 Id. at 151–52. 
 12 Id. at 152. 
 13 Id.  
 14 James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Sub-
jectivity, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1133–34 (2013) (internal footnote omitted).  
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forcement, thereby introducing unnecessary subjectivity into the analysis 
and lending itself to Virginia School-styled rent seeking in antitrust.15 
Andres Lerner argues that claims of Big Data presenting competitive 
concerns are unsupported by real world evidence.16 In particular, Lerner 
argues that in practice the oft-cited “feedback loops” do not have the strong 
effects with which they are commonly credited.17 Lerner discusses the pro-
competitive rationales for collection and use of consumer data online, in-
cluding the potential for improved services, and the ability of firms to 
monetize effectively on the paid side so as to provide better services at 
lower prices or for free.18 He dismisses the idea that firms’ may have the 
incentive or ability to use data to entrench their dominant position (e.g., 
user data is non-rivalrous and no one firm controls a significant share of 
data), citing attributes of data similar to those listed by Ohlhausen and 
Okuliar.19 Lerner maintains that there is a complete lack of evidence that 
online markets have “tipped” to dominant firms, due in most part to the 
differentiated nature of online offerings.20 He concludes that without strong 
real-world evidence of anticompetitive effects, aggressive antitrust en-
forcement would hamper competition and chill innovation, injuring con-
sumer welfare in the process.21  
Although policy makers have dipped their toe into the antitrust in Big 
Data debate,22 antitrust agencies and the courts have not found a Big Data 
competition problem. In fact, the FTC and DG Competition have thor-
oughly considered Big Data as an antitrust problem and completely dis-
missed it.23 The antitrust authorities in the United States, at DG Competition 
  
 15 Id. at 1138–44. See also Fred S. McChesney et al., Competition Policy in Public Choice Per-
spective, in 1 OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 156, 163 (Roger D. 
Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015). 
 16 Andres V. Lerner, The Role of “Big Data” in Online Platform Competition 4–5 (2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2482780. 
 17 Id. at 20. 
 18 Id. at 10–12. 
 19 Id. at 20–23. 
 20 Id. at 46–53. 
 21 Id. at 62. 
 22 See European Data Protection Supervisor, Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protec-
tion Supervisor: Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: The Interplay Between Data 
Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy, at 6–7 (Mar. 2014), 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2014/14-
03- 26_competitition_law_big_data_EN.pdf; Debbie Feinstein, The Not-So-Big News About Big Data, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jun. 16, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/ 
06/not-so-big-news-about-big-data; Darren S. Tucker & Hill B. Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big 
Data, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2014, at 5. 
 23 See Deborah Feinstein, Big Data in a Competition Environment, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 
2015, at 2; Abir Roy, European Antitrust Enforcers Move on Holders of Big Data, KLUWER 
COMPETITION L. BLOG (May 26, 2016), http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2016/05/26/european-
antitrust-enforcers-move-on-holders-of-big-data/. 
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and at the national level French and German Competition authorities24 and 
Europe have moved cautiously so far. This forbearance is not only proper, 
but also serves as a reminder that the distinct issues addressed by antitrust 
and consumer protection law, and the solutions that may be applied by each 
set of laws to prohibited behavior, are distinct for good reason, and are 
complements, rather than substitutes.25  
II. CAN BIG DATA LEAD TO PRO-COMPETITIVE BENEFITS? 
Unprecedented consumer benefits have already been realized through 
the use of Big Data, chief among them free user services (as a number of 
the cases have noted),26 improved quality, and a rapid increase in innova-
tion. Furthermore, fears surrounding Big Data and its use by large online 
firms are unwarranted, as the economic traits of Big Data ameliorate con-
cerns that such data can be manipulated for anticompetitive gains. 
A. Monetization of Data Subsidizes Free Products for Consumers 
Perhaps the most obvious and pervasive benefit to be realized in the 
Big Data era has been the ability of firms to offer heavily subsidized, often 
free, services to consumers as consumers give those firms permission to 
monetize consumer data on the other side of their business.27 In a competi-
tion law regime where lower prices for consumers are deemed highly desir-
able, this is undoubtedly a benefit to consumers. 
  
 24 Bundeskartellamt (German Federal Cartel Office) and the Autorité de la concurrence (French 
Competition Authority), Competition Law and Data, at 53 (May 10, 2016), http://www.bunde 
skartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.pdf?__blob=publication 
File&v=2 (Finding that “[a] case-specific assessment of the reality and extent of the ‘data advantage’ 
needs to be undertaken to bear out or reject this premise [of market power]” and that no specific real 
world case has of yet been identified.). 
 25 See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust 
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L. J. 713, 718 (1997); Timothy J. Muris & Paloma 
Zepeda, The Benefits, and Potential Costs, of FTC-Style Regulation in Protecting Consumers, 8 
COMPETITION L. INT’L 11, 11 (2012) (“Like peanut butter and jelly, competition and consumer protec-
tion regulation work better when combined.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Case T-79/12, Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 73 (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145461&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=44480; Streetmap.eu Ltd. v. Google Inc. [2016] EWHC 253 
(Ch) [22] (Eng.); Case COMP/M.7217—Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, 2014 O.J. (C 7239) 
24-25, ¶ 90.  
 27 See RUSSELL WALKER, FROM BIG DATA TO BIG PROFITS: SUCCESS WITH DATA AND 
ANALYTICS 141–42 (2015); Lerner, supra note 16, at 12. See also, Case COMP/M.7217—
Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 47 (Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that “[t]he vast majority of social 
networking services are provided free of monetary charges”). 
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The monetization of the data in the form of targeted advertising sales 
for antitrust purposes is not suspect or harmful, but rather “economically-
rational, profit-maximizing behavior,” that results in obvious consumer 
benefit.28 Were online platforms prevented or restricted from collecting and 
monetizing consumer data, competition for users would be inhibited, and 
harm to consumers would result, in the form of higher prices for services.29 
Indeed switching costs are low regarding data and search.30  
Some criticize the provision of free services, claiming that this makes 
it more difficult for rivals that cannot initially monetize as effectively to 
compete with established rivals,31 but cases show that this argument misses 
the point completely.32 The ability to offer high-quality services to consum-
ers for free is a procompetitive effect of Big Data monetization, not an an-
ticompetitive harm.33 Also, the assertion is simply untrue—it is not more 
difficult for new entrants to compete with established rivals in free serv-
ices.34  
B. Improved Quality and Enhanced Innovation 
As an input, online firms use data to improve and refine products and 
services in a number of ways, and to develop brand new innovative product 
offerings. For example, search engines, both general and niche, can use data 
to deliver more relevant, high quality search results.35 By learning from user 
search queries and clicks, search engines can identify the most relevant 
results for a particular query. “Click-and-query” data, as it is known, is a 
highly valuable input in delivering high quality search results.36 Outside of 
just relevant results, search engines can use data to provide additional 
  
 28 Lerner, supra note 16, at 13. 
 29 Id. at 15. 
 30 Id. at 50; Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust Analysis: 
A Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169, 177 (2013); see also, Case 
COMP/M.7217—Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 73 (Mar. 10, 2014) (noting that data sets 
should not have an impact in a market for online advertising because there are so many different sources 
of user data available on the web). 
 31 Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. 
ON REG. 401, 427–28 (2014).  
 32 See, e.g., Judgment, Streetmap.eu Ltd. v. Google Inc. [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch), [138]-[39] 
(Eng.).  
 33 Lerner, supra note 16, at 17; Torsten Körber, Common Errors Regarding Search Engine Regu-
lation —and How to Avoid Them, 36 EURO. COMPETITION L. REV. 239, 240 (2015). 
 34 See generally Case COMP/M.7217—Facebook/WhatsApp, Comm’n Decision (Mar. 10, 2014). 
 35 Michael A. Salinger and Robert J. Levinson, Economics and the FTC’s Google Investigation, 
46 REV. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 25, 47 (2015). 
 36 Id. 
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“value-added” services to users.37 For example, travel search engines can 
use data to forecast price trends on flights for specific routes.38 Amazon and 
multiple other e-commerce sites use past purchase information and brows-
ing history to make personalized shopping recommendations for users.39 
Social networking platforms use data collected from users to suggest 
friends, celebrity or business pages, or articles that customers might be in-
terested in.40 Online media outlets use browsing history and personal infor-
mation to recommend other articles that a reader may be interested in. 
C. Economic Characteristics of Big Data Protect Against Competitive 
Harm 
In addition to the affirmative pro-competitive benefits of Big Data ex-
pounded above, the economics of how Big Data works, as described below, 
damages claims that it should be feared or reined in by antitrust. Addition-
ally, the unique economic characteristics of data mean that its accumulation 
does not, by itself, create a barrier to entry, and does not automatically en-
dow a firm with either the incentive or the ability to foreclose rivals, expand 
or sustain its own monopoly, or harm competition in other ways.41 Lam-
brecht and Tucker explain that “[f]or there to be a sustainable competitive 
advantage, the firm’s rivals must be unable realistically to duplicate the 
benefits of [the] strategy or input.”42 As suggested below, both theory and 
actual cases support a finding that the characteristics of data are such that 
larger online firms cannot foreclose rivals from replicating the benefits of 
Big Data they enjoy, and that Big Data in the hands of large firms does not 
necessarily pose a significant antitrust risk. 
  
 37 See generally RUSSELL WALKER, FROM BIG DATA TO BIG PROFITS: SUCCESS WITH DATA AND 
ANALYTICS (2015). 
 38 Brian Honigman, How Big Data Is Transforming The Travel Industry, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/centurylink/2014/04/30/how-big-data-is-transforming-the-travel-
industry/#1d9907a5423c.  
 39 Mark Milian, Retailers Use Big Data to Turn You Into a Big Spender, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 4, 
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-03/retailers-use-big-data-to-turn-you-into-a-big-spend 
er.html; see also Phil Simon, How to Get Over Your Inaction on Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 2014, 
https://hbr.org/2014/02/how-to-get-over-your-inaction-on-big-data-2.  
 40 For a detailed study extracting (sampling) and characterizing Facebook user data, see Minas 
Gjoka et al., Walking in Facebook: A Case Study of Unbiased Sampling of OSNs, 29 INST. OF ELEC. 
AND ELEC. ENG’RS (2010), http://www.minasgjoka.com/papers/unbiasedsampling-infocom2010.pdf. 
 41 See generally Anja Lambrecht & Catherine E. Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firm from 
Competition? (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705530 (evaluating the 
strategic role of big data as a source of sustainable competitive advantage). 
 42 Id. at 4–5. 
1136 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 23:5 
1. Low Barriers to Entry 
Data driven markets are typically characterized by low entry barriers, 
as evidenced by innovative challengers emerging rapidly and displacing 
established firms with much greater data resources than themselves.43 While 
the existence or lack thereof of barriers to entry can, and will, differ from 
market to market, and a blanket determination cannot be made in the ab-
stract, the history of the digital economy offers many examples, like Slack, 
Facebook, Snapchat, and Tinder, where a simple insight into customer 
needs enabled entry and rapid success despite established network effects.44 
The data requirements of new competitors are far more modest and 
qualitatively different than those of more established firms.45 Little, if any, 
user data is required as a starting point for most online services. Instead, 
firms may enter with innovative new products that skillfully address cus-
tomer needs, and quickly collect data from users, which they can then use 
for further product improvement and success.46 As such, new entrants are 
unlikely to be at a significant competitive disadvantage relative to incum-
bents in terms of data collection or analysis.47 
And, while a firm that has been operational for ten years may have a 
larger data store than a new entrant, lack of asset equivalence has never 
been a sufficient basis to define a barrier to entry in any cases as of yet.48 In 
brick-and-mortar retail, a new entrant may have a smaller showroom than 
an established competitor, but this does not render the need for a physical 
store an insurmountable barrier to entry. Indeed, an established brick-and-
mortar store could have much more data on local customer preferences, but 
that has never been viewed as prohibitive to entry. 
2. Data is Ubiquitous, Inexpensive, and Easy to Collect 
Data is ubiquitous, inexpensive, and easy to collect.49 Users are con-
stantly creating data, as increased internet and smartphone usage means 
customers are continuously leaving behind traces of their needs and prefer-
ences.50 Firms can easily and quickly collect data from consumers upon 
launch, and both data and the tools needed to store and analyze it are read-
  
 43 Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 1–2.  
 44 Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 11–15.  
 45 Tucker & Wellford, supra note 22, at 6–9.  
 46 Id.  
 47 Id.  
 48 See id.  
 49 Catherine Tucker, The Implications of Improved Attribution and Measurability for Antitrust and 
Privacy in Online Advertising Markets, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2013). 
 50 See Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 6-7.  
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ily available from numerous third party sources. Big Data has near-zero 
marginal costs of production and distribution.51 Firms are able to collect 
data from many different sources, demonstrating the reality that users leave 
“multiple digital footprints” wherever they tread online.52 The fact that data 
can, therefore, be acquired from third party sources means that even on the 
first day of product launch, before any user has interacted with the platform, 
a provider can already have benefitted from insights into consumer prefer-
ences and designed a platform that can act quickly as data is collected and 
processed. 
While some argue that the resources and effort expended by compa-
nies in pursuit of data is evidence enough that data collection and process-
ing is both “costly” and “time-consuming,”53 it is important to distinguish 
between the collection of raw data and the analysis any given firm puts the 
data through, which is what makes the data valuable. This is the firm’s “se-
cret sauce.” This analysis is also, incidentally, the part of a firm’s Big Data 
usage that requires the most resources.54 There is also plenty of off-the-shelf 
and open source analytics software that could give small firms a head start. 
3. Data is Non-Exclusive and Non-Rivalrous 
Data is non-exclusive and non-rivalrous. No one firm can, or does, 
control all of the world’s data. Collection of a piece of data by one firm 
does not occur at the expense of another firm. “Multi-homing” is the norm 
among internet users—users can, and do, spread their data around the inter-
net, using multiple different providers for multiple different services, or 
sometimes the same service.55 While multi-homing, a user shares data with 
multiple providers.56 Multi-homing also serves to reduce market power.57 
Big Data has been likened to other inputs as it becomes an increas-
ingly important asset.58 However, Big Data’s non-rivalrous and non-
exclusive nature sets it apart from other key inputs. If one provider has a 
piece of data, another provider is not prevented from collecting that very 
same piece of data. Similarly, while one provider could at least theoretically 
  
 51 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE 
NETWORK ECONOMY 24 (1999). 
 52 Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 3. 
 53 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Debunking the Myths over Big Data and Antitrust, CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2015, at 7. 
 54 John Bantleman, The Big Cost of Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/ciocentral/2012/04/16/the-big-cost-of-big-data/#3ecaa8286a21.  
 55 Lambrecht & Tucker, supra 41, at 7. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668, 669-70 
(2006). 
 58 See Tucker & Welford, supra note 22, at 4. 
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hold all of the world’s oil resources, for example, no one provider can 
amass all available data. Furthermore, incumbent online providers do not 
have explicit or de facto exclusivity over user data. There are no exclusivity 
clauses in terms of service with users, and there are no structures (pricing or 
otherwise) that lock users into sharing their data with only one provider.59 
4. Data’s Value is Short-Lived 
Data has a limited lifespan—old data is not nearly as valuable as new 
data—and the value of data lessens considerably over time.60 Additionally, 
the returns on scale diminish over time.61 Therefore, any competitive advan-
tage that data provides is fleeting, and entrants are unlikely to be signifi-
cantly disadvantaged relative to incumbents in terms of data collection and 
analysis.62 The need for fresh, differentiated data means that a holding a 
large volume of stale or generalized data does not, necessarily, benefit the 
holder and disadvantage a potential challenger. Potential competitors do not 
need to create a data store “equivalent to the size of the incumbent”; they 
rather need to devise a strategy to accumulate highly relevant and timely 
data.63  
5. Data Alone is Not Enough 
Data does not typically provide value on a standalone basis. Mere pos-
session of data alone therefore, even in large volume, does not secure com-
  
 59 See Andrea Renda, Searching for Harm or Harming Search? A Look at the European Commis-
sion’s Antitrust Investigation Against Google 30, (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 
118, 2015) (“The existence of widespread multi-homing makes barriers to entry and switching even 
more evanescent.”), https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/AR%20Antitrust%20Investigation%20Google. 
pdf. 
 60 Lockwood Lyon, The End of Big Data, DATABASE J. (May 16, 2016), http://www. 
databasejournal.com/features/db2/the-end-of-big-data.html (“As data ages it tends to become less rele-
vant for the following reasons: Newly implemented operational applications will not have a data history; 
Older products are removed and replaced by new products; Older customers may no longer exist; As 
you apply maintenance to current operational systems, some analyses of ‘old’ behavior becomes irrele-
vant; Older data tends to be less accurate and sometimes is missing altogether, [and] as operational 
systems are adjusted to fix these problems, inaccurate or missing historical data will skew analyses.”). 
 61 William Terdoslavich, Big Data & The Law Of Diminishing Returns, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.informationweek.com/big-data/big-data-analytics/big-data-and-the-law-of-
diminishing-returns/d/d-id/1323310.  
 62 See generally Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, Search Engines and Data Retention: Implica-
tions for Privacy and Antitrust (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5094-14, May 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2441333. 
 63 Nils-Peter Schepp & Achim Wambach, On Big Data and Its Relevance for Market Power 
Assessment, 7 J. EUR. COMP. L. & PRAC. 120, 122 (2016). 
2016] ANTITRUST AND REGULATING BIG DATA 1139 
petitive success—that can only be achieved through engineering talent, 
quality of service, speed of innovation, and attention to consumer needs. As 
such, the firm with the most data does not necessarily win. Take the online 
dating application, Tinder, initially launched in September 2012, as an ex-
ample. Data is of particular value in industries where personalized experi-
ence is important, such as online dating.64 When Tinder launched, it had no 
access to user data, but nevertheless it became the market leader within a 
couple of years.65 Lambrecht and Tucker explain that even in this highly 
data driven industry, Tinder succeeded not through reliance on Big Data, 
but due to the strength of its underlying solution.66 A simple user interface 
and a precise attention to consumer needs resulted in massive gains for the 
new entrant. Similarly, despite facing competition from long established 
incumbents with access to huge volumes of data, amassed over years of 
customer service, WhatsApp was able to take on more established messag-
ing and social networks because of its low cost and easy-to-use interface.67 
Examination of these industries leads Lambrecht and Tucker to conclude 
that to build a sustainable competitive advantage from Big Data, a firm 
needs to focus on developing both the managerial toolkit and organizational 
competence that allows them to turn Big Data into value to consumers in 
previously impossible ways, rather than simply amassing tremendous 
amounts of data.68 
6. Highly Differentiated Platforms Need Highly Differentiated Data 
Online platforms are highly differentiated, even in the provision of the 
same type of service, and as each entrant carves out a niche, the most useful 
data to them differs more and more from the data most useful to their ri-
vals.69 Consumers are moving towards meeting more precise, niche con-
sumer needs. A consumer looking to book a flight could use Kayak, Expe-
dia, Orbitz, or a multitude of other travel-dedicated search engines. The 
same is true in internet shopping, online dating, social networking, product 
and service reviews, and a host of other online markets. In today’s online 
environment, successful firms must carve out their own niche, and increas-
ingly, data that is useful (even crucial) to one firm may not be useful to its 
  
 64 See Paul Rubens, Is Big Data Dating the Key to Long-lasting Romance?, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26613909.  
 65 Emily Witt, Love Me Tinder, GQ (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.gq.com/story/tinder-online-
dating-sex-app (“Until recently, hookup apps were straightforward but sleazy. Then along came Tinder, 
the dating-hookup hybrid that made things simpler, sexier, and particularly lady-friendly. In just fifteen 
months, it seems to have cracked the code and caught fire.”). 
 66 Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 14. 
 67 Id. at 12. 
 68 Id. at 16. 
 69 See Schepp & Wambach, supra note 63, at 122. 
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competitors.70 An astute and innovative entrant will identify a niche where 
the incumbent does not have requisite data, and can very quickly “catch up” 
to the incumbent in terms of valuable data amassed. 
III. DOES BIG DATA POSE HARM TO COMPETITION? 
Although data as a potential antitrust concern is not a particularly new 
issue, what has changed dramatically in recent years is the size and scope of 
the data that firms collect, store, and use. As Deborah Feinstein, head of the 
FTC’s Bureau of Competition put it, “What is new is the explosion in the 
collection and use of data about consumers, from their shopping habits to 
their sensitive health information.”71 With the growth in the amount of data 
and the advent of Big Data, the importance of that data as an input in online 
platforms has also increased. The growing importance of Big Data as an 
input, and the consistent increase in the 4 Vs of data—volume, velocity, 
variety, and value72—means that companies are now more than ever under-
taking data-driven strategies to gain operational efficiencies,73 and, some 
argue, to gain and sustain an unfair competitive advantage.74 
This section describes a number of ways in which some have argued 
that firms can use Big Data to perpetuate an unfair competitive advantage 
and consequently distort competition and harm consumers. These commen-
tators argue that Big Data arms online providers with the incentive and abil-
ity to erect barriers to entry and maintain dominance by “limit[ing] their 
competitors’ access to data, prevent[ing] others from sharing the data, and 
oppos[ing] data-portability policies that threaten data-related competitive 
advantages.”75 The resulting harm, according to such critics, is “not neces-
sarily higher price[s]” (considering most of these services are provided for 
free), but rather a “loss of quality, innovation, and privacy.”76  
  
 70 See id.  
 71 Feinstein, supra note 22.  
 72 Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in 
the Era of Big Data, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2015, at 2 n.13 (quoting ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), SUPPORTING INVESTMENT IN KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL, GROWTH AND 
INNOVATION 12 (2013) (“Value is a fourth V which is related to the increasing socioeconomic value to 
be obtained from the use of big data. It is the potential economic and social value that ultimately moti-
vates the accumulation, processing and use of data.”)); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG 
DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 2 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (“Most definitions [of “big data”] reflect 
the growing technological ability to capture, aggregate, and process an ever-greater volume, velocity, 
and variety of data.”). 
 73 See Lambrecht & Tucker, supra note 41, at 12. 
 74 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at 2. 
 75 Id.; see also Newman, supra note 31, at 403.  
 76 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen Grunes, Dancing Around Data, THE HILL: CONG. BLOG. (Dec. 10, 
2014, 11.30 A.M.), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/226502-dancing-around-data. 
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To properly assess the antitrust implications of Big Data, we must un-
derstand fully the ways in which online platforms use Big Data and the 
nature of competition among them. A crucial starting point in this endeavor 
is a solid understanding of two-sided platforms. A two-sided platform exists 
when one provider caters to two different customers groups on different 
sides of the same platform.77 For example, social media platforms give us-
ers free access to social networking services on one side of the platform and 
rely on the provision of advertising services to businesses on the other side 
of the platform for revenue.78 A proper antitrust assessment of any two-
sided platform must take into account competition on each side of the plat-
form.79 It is important to recognize that certain actions may cause procom-
petitive effects for the platform as a whole, while initially appearing an-
ticompetitive on one side of the platform. A comprehensive antitrust analy-
sis cannot look at one side of the platform in a vacuum—it must weigh the 
benefits and harm to the platform as a whole.80  
A. Loss of Quality and Innovation 
While firms with access to troves of Big Data can use it to improve the 
quality of their products in several ways, a number of practitioners have 
argued that misuse of Big Data may result in a loss of quality.81 While the 
exact parameters of this proposition are open to debate, scale in data is, 
indisputably, important in improving the quality of online services. Smaller 
firms, the argument goes, often cannot adequately compete with larger 
firms because they lack access to the same volume of data as the larger 
firm. As the data gap, and consequently the quality gap, widens between the 
dominant firm and a smaller rival, the competitive constraint the rival poses 
to the dominant firm in terms of quality and innovation is diminished. The 
  
 77 Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 1, at 408–10. 
 78 Inge Graef, Market Definition and Market Power in Data: The Case of Online Platforms, 38 
WORLD COMPETITION: LAW AND ECON. REV. 473, 476–77 (2015).  
 79 Note, however, that the analytical appropriateness of the two-sided market is not without de-
bate. See Marcela Mattiuzzo, Online Advertising Platforms and Personal Data Retail: Consequences for 
Antitrust Law, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., July 2015, at 2 (“[O]ne should question whether continuing to 
apply [the two-sided model] without qualification is the most suitable course forward . . . . There are 
platforms that fit the two-sided model poorly and whose antitrust analysis could thus profit from a 
different framework.”). 
 80 See Salinger & Levinson, supra note 35, at 49–50; Hemant K. Bhargava et al., The Move to 
Smart Mobile and Its Implications for Antitrust Analysis of Online Markets, U.C. Davis L. Rev. (forth-
coming) (manuscript at 36), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2721394. 
 81 See Grunes & Stucke, supra note 72, at 5. But see Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Access 
Barriers to Big Data (forthcoming) (manuscript at 38) (on file with author) (“In other situations, big 
data advantages may increase the incentives of other firms to compete not only on the big-data-based-
information, but on other dimensions of the product, including quality and price.”). 
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larger firm, in this scenario, is not driven to innovate or to maximize quality 
for the consumer.82 
Stucke and Ezrachi argue that inequality in access to data can lead to 
the potential degradation of quality for consumers in search engines in par-
ticular.83 They claim that large search engines have the incentive and ability 
to prioritize paid advertising over more relevant, better quality, organic 
search results.84 On a search engine, more advertisements, displayed more 
prominently, benefit both the advertiser and the search provider. More ads 
increase the opportunities for user clicks. This in turn means a greater like-
lihood of a pay-per-click conversion for the platform provider and a better 
chance of a product sale for the advertiser. Where this becomes an antitrust 
problem, Stucke and Ezrachi suggest, is where Big Data has widened the 
gap between large and small providers to the extent that a smaller provider 
cannot provide adequate quality competition to prevent its larger rival from 
sacrificing some degree of search quality in favor of expanding profits on 
the paid side.85 The fact that a large search engine has access to so much 
data, and therefore the ability to improve search quality to such a high de-
gree, means it can afford to sacrifice a higher level of search quality than a 
smaller search engine (who is already struggling on quality due to lower 
data levels) could.86 Additionally, the disparity in data volume means that 
users are generally unable to detect small degradations in quality—they just 
know that Google is giving a better result than Bing, but not how much bet-
ter.87 
In addition to the lack of real world supporting evidence, this theory of 
harm also begs the question whether incremental degradation in quality by 
a search provider whose quality is still superior to rivals is an antitrust con-
cern. Does a firm have an obligation to provide the absolute best quality 
product it can, even if not profit maximizing? No court or antitrust regulator 
has ever imposed such a requirement. And, in this example, how does a 
regulator measure the “best quality search results,” since quality is relative 
and users are said to not be able to accurately assess quality? 
These questions aside, this loss of quality theory also overlooks the 
importance of analyzing both sides of the two-sided platform. While no ads 
at all would certainly improve search quality, it would clearly be very det-
rimental to advertisers. Increasing ad space might be beneficial to advertis-
ers, but could admittedly lead to search quality degradation for users. Anti-
trust analysis requires a balancing act and an understanding of the inherent 
  
 82 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 76. 
 83 Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at 
Search Engines, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 103 (2016). 
 84 Id. at 91–92. 
 85 See id. at 96–97. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. at 101–02. 
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tradeoffs between both sides of the platform. A holistic approach to the 
economic efficiency of the conduct is required, as opposed to delegating to 
antitrust the responsibility (instead of properly assigned to the market itself) 
to police whether search quality dips below “levels that consumers prefer,” 
as Stucke and Ezrachi claim.88 
In addition to the alleged degradation in quality that can occur, Big 
Data can also, some allege, stifle innovation. Where a firm’s value proposi-
tion is built on collecting and monetizing user data, if that firm collects so 
much user data that it becomes entrenched, it may gain both the ability and 
the incentive to use that data in a number of ways to eliminate potential 
challengers.89 As this happens, smaller rivals are prevented from accessing 
necessary data, and the incentive for these firms to innovate and to compete 
with larger dominant firms is reduced. For example, a dominant firm with 
access to Big Data could conceivably look to trends in data to identify po-
tential challengers and devise strategies to quickly stamp out any rising 
competition by limiting or preventing their access to necessary data, or by 
acquiring them.90 Where market leaders with deep pockets acquire potential 
or actual new entrants, a source of innovation is removed, and competition 
suffers.91 Of course, such a discernment of trends may also be beneficial to 
competition where it forces a market leader to further invest in innovation 
itself, as antitrust law fundamentals contemplate.92 It is also worth bearing 
in mind that acquiring a smaller rival is not, without proof that such acquisi-
tion is likely to substantially lessen competition, prohibited under the anti-
trust laws. Indeed, the potential for such acquisitions incentivizes entry.93 
B. Harm to Privacy 
Proponents of antitrust involvement in Big Data suggest that consum-
ers feel they do not have control over how online platform providers use 
  
 88 Id. at 91. 
 89 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 76.  
 90 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at 8.  
 91 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 6.4 
(2010) (“The Agencies also consider whether a merger is likely to give the merged firm an incentive to 
cease offering one of the relevant products sold by the merging parties.”). 
 92 Id. (“The Agencies also consider whether the merger is likely to enable innovation that would 
not otherwise take place, by bringing together complementary capabilities that cannot be otherwise 
combined or for some other merger-specific reason.”). 
 93 Id. (“Competition often spurs firms to innovate. The Agencies may consider whether a merger 
is likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging the merged firm to curtail its innovative 
efforts below the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger.”) 
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and collect their data.94 Ohlhausen and Okuliar agree that “many consumers 
. . . are worried about the privacy losses associated with extensive collec-
tion and manipulation of consumer information online.”95 Some argue that 
consumers continue to utilize free services provided by “internet giants” 
only because they are faced with no viable alternative than to use these 
services and “pay” by divulging their personal information.96 As users cre-
ate more and more data, and firms continue to collect it, the safeguards pro-
tecting its collection and use may well become more important and more 
vulnerable to attack. The economics literature shows that, in fact, the col-
lection of data may provide improved services,97 product recommenda-
tions,98 or free content.99  
Privacy protections can be considered a form of non-price competi-
tion, which is especially important in industries where the service itself is 
offered for free.100 Firms may compete by offering tighter or more transpar-
ent privacy policies.101 Yet Jones Harbour and Koslov argue that consumers 
can be harmed when a dominant firm has no incentive to invest in privacy 
protections (especially where it may harm the firm’s ability to monetize on 
the paid side), and its competitors are too small, or their quality too inferior, 
to exert competitive pressure significant enough to discipline the dominant 
firm.102 Consumers may feel they have no choice but to use the dominant 
firm in order to get good quality results. Alternatively, the lack of viable 
good quality alternatives may endow users with a higher “tolerance” for 
weaker results. Acquisti offers a literature review that provides a more nu-
anced view of different ways consumers value privacy.103 His analysis 
  
 94 Pamela Jones Harbour & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An Expanded Vision 
of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 782 (2010); Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at 
6.  
 95 Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 4, at 122. 
 96 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 76. 
 97 Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase History, 24 
MARKETING SCI. 367, 368 (2005). 
 98 James Bennett & Stan Lanning, The Netflix Prize, 2007 PROC. OF KDD CUP & WORKSHOP, 
https://www.cs.uic.edu/~liub/KDD-cup-2007/NetflixPrize-description.pdf. 
 99 See Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy Regulation and Online Advertising, 57 MGMT. 
SCI. 57, 61 (2011). 
 100 Ohlhausen & Okuliar, supra note 4, at 133 (“[P]rivacy protection has emerged as a small, but 
rapidly expanding, dimension of price competition among digital platforms.”). 
 101 David S. Evans, The Online Advertising Industry: Economics, Evolution, and Privacy, 23 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 37, 57 (2009); Scott J. Savage & Donald M. Waldman, Privacy Tradeoffs in Smartphone 
Applications, 137 ECON. LETTERS 171, 171 (2015). 
 102 Harbour & Koslov, supra note 94, at 785 n. 50.  
 103 Alessandro Acquisti, From the Economics of Privacy to the Economics of Big Data, in 
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 91 (Stefan Bender et al. 
eds., 2014) (“Evaluations and conclusions regarding the economic value of privacy and the optimal 
balance between disclosure and protection are, therefore, far from simple.”). 
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shows that issues involving privacy trade-offs are more complex than Jones 
Harbour and Koslov advocate. 
It is important to note however that harm to privacy does not, without 
more, equal harm to competition. And, as discussed in more detail below, 
antitrust is ill-equipped to solve consumer law problems. In a recent speech, 
FTC Chairwoman Ramirez correctly characterized these issues as risks best 
addressed by consumer protection and privacy laws:  
As you can see, every step in the life cycle of big data raises the potential for significant pri-
vacy and other risks. First, despite the potential for big data’s positive impact on the lives of 
consumers, there is a real risk of lack of transparency and loss of consumer control . . . . Sec-
ond, there is a risk of unexpected and unwelcome use of data [such as data being used with-
out consent] . . . . Third, big data raises concerns about data security.”104  
The major data issues are thus not antitrust issues at all! 
C. Data-Driven Mergers and Data Driven Defenses 
The number of Big Data related merger cases has increased over time. 
In this context, further potential harms could, some argue, arise from data-
driven mergers where the transaction rationale rests on the acquirer gaining 
access to the underlying data set of the target undertaking.105 Stucke and 
Grunes argue that such data driven mergers can “potentially lessen non-
price competition in terms of the array of privacy protections offered to 
consumers.”106 They and others suggest that where privacy constitutes an 
important dimension of competition in a given market, 107 or represents an 
important element of transaction rationale, antitrust agencies should closely 
examine transactions to determine whether the combination is likely to re-
duce incentives to compete in providing privacy protections to consumers. 
An early example of this argument can be found in then-Commissioner 
Harbour’s dissenting statement in the investigation of Google’s acquisition 
of DoubleClick, which suggested that privacy could be “‘cognizable’ under 
the antitrust laws,” and should have been considered by the Commission 
  
 104 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Remarks at the International Conference 
on Big Data from a Privacy Perspective: Protecting Privacy in the Era of Big Data (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/06/protecting-privacy-era-big-data-remarks-ftc-
chairwoman-edith-ramirez.  
 105 Graef, supra note 78, at 19-20.  
 106 Stucke & Grunes, supra note 53, at 5. 
 107 See generally Graef, supra note 78.  
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“as part of its antitrust analysis of the transaction.”108 The former Commis-
sioner’s statement cited a theory that network effects could lead to fewer 
search engines, reducing “incentives of search firms to compete based on 
privacy protections or related non-price dimensions.”109  
These concerns have not been born out yet by any actual cases. In the 
U.S., the antitrust agencies have had occasion to consider the role of Big 
Data in a number high profile mergers, and merging parties have increas-
ingly put forth data driven efficiencies in defense of mergers, with varying 
degrees of success.110 For example, with respect to ratings and reviews plat-
form provider Bazaarvoice’s 2012 acquisition of rival PowerReviews, both 
the Department of Justice and the trial court rejected the parties’ efficiency 
claims, citing a lack of evidence that the transaction had resulted in data 
gains that lead to an improved product, lower prices, or greater innova-
tion.111 On the other hand, during the Department of Justice’s 2010 investi-
gation into a search-related partnership between Microsoft and Yahoo!, the 
Justice Department did accept the parties’ data driven efficiency argument, 
suggesting that the transaction might be pro-competitive where increased 
access to data enabled more rapid improvements in Microsoft’s search of-
fering, thereby creating a more viable competitive alternative to Google.112  
In Europe, although the Commission did not ultimately opine on this 
particular issue, the parties to the TomTom/TeleAtlas merger argued that 
customer feedback data would allow the combined firm to produce better 
digital maps at a faster pace.113 The Commission noted low switching costs 
and limited pass through to consumers.114 As such, the Commission found 
that there was no incentive to foreclose competitors.115 In another case, the 
Commission found that the Telefonica/Vodafone/Everything Everywhere 
joint venture posed no Big Data problem with regard to the data analytics 
services because of robust competition in the market to store data and alter-
  
 108 Pamela Jones Harbour, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Dissenting Statement Regarding In re 
Google/DoubleClick, FTC File No. 071-0170 (Dec. 20, 2007), at 10, http://www ftc.gov 
/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statementmattergoogle/doubleclick/071220harbour_0.p
df [hereinafter Harbour Dissenting Statement].  
 109 Id. at 10 n. 25. 
 110 See generally Grunes & Stucke, supra note 72, at 3. Precedential cases involving Big Data are 
explored more thoroughly in Part IV below. 
 111 Id. (citing United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, 
at *62–64 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014)). 
 112 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
on its Decision to Close Its Investigation of the Internet Search and Paid Search Advertising Agreement 
Between Microsoft Corporation and Yahoo! Inc. (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
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 113 Case COMP/M.4854, TomTom/TeleAtlas, Comm’n Decision, 2008 O.J. (C 237) 53–54, ¶¶ 
245–50. 
 114 Id. at 22, ¶ 106 ([T]he Commission considers barriers to switching to be relatively limited.”). 
 115 Id. at 50, ¶ 230 
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natives.116 Similarly, the Commission did not find a Big Data problem in 
Publicis/Omnicom, where the Commission noted competition from alterna-
tive providers of big data analytics.117 
D. The Perceived Strength of Scale, Network Effects, and Barriers to En-
try 
Many, if not all, of the theories of harm attributed to Big Data rest on 
the perceived strength of the “feedback loop” and the consequential net-
work effects enjoyed by large firms with access to tremendous amounts of 
data.118 Big Data can give rise to network effects, and certainly, network 
effects can play a significant role in a sound antitrust analysis. However, 
agencies, policy makers, and scholars must resist any foregone conclusion 
that the presence of network effects in Big Data automatically results in 
anticompetitive harm. 
Big Data can lead to economies of scale via the alleged “feedback 
loop.” In search, some argue, “the availability of data on previous search 
queries is crucial” to competitive success.119 There are two ways the “feed-
  
 116 Case COMP/M.6314, Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, Comm’n 
Decision, 2012 O.J. (C 66) 122, ¶ 543 (noting that “[c]ustomers generally tend to give their personal 
data to many market players, which gather and market it. Therefore, this type of data is generally under-
stood to be a commodity.”). See also European Commission Press Release IP/12/938, Mergers: Com-
mission Clears the Creation of a Mobile Commerce Joint Venture by UK Mobile Operators Telefónica, 
Vodafone and Everything Everywhere (Sept. 5, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-
938_en.htm (“The market investigation revealed that a number of alternatives already exist and much 
more are very likely to emerge in the near future to ensure adequate competitive pressure on the joint 
venture's mobile wallet platform. Some of these alternatives may rely on a secure access to the SIM card 
of the mobile handsets in order to store sensitive data like bank account numbers, etc. This access will 
be controlled by the mobile network operators, including in particular the three parents of the joint 
venture. However, other alternatives exist which do not store sensitive data on SIM-cards and it is 
unlikely that the creation of the joint venture will allow the parent mobile network operators to block 
these alternative routes to market using technical or commercial means.”). 
 117 Case COMP/M.7023, Publicis/Omnicom, Comm’n Decision, 2014 O.J. (C 84) 122, ¶ 640. See 
also Paul McGeown & Aude Barthelemy, Recent Developments in EU Merger Control 2014, 6 J. EURO. 
COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 440, 445 (2015) (“One of the important factors given weight by the 
Commission in deciding not to challenge the transaction was the ability of customers to cut out (or at 
least threaten to cut out) intermediary agencies such as the parties and purchase directly from media 
vendors. While the market investigation suggested that the proportion of direct purchases was relatively 
small, a large majority of media owners replied that they do make direct sales and half of the customers 
who replied to questionnaires said that they had in fact bought directly from media vendors in the pre-
ceding 3 years.”). 
 118 European Data Protection Supervisor Press Release EDPS/2014/06, Privacy and Competitive-
ness in the Age of Big Data (Mar. 26, 2014), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_EDPS-14-
6_en.htm?locale=en (“The collection and control of massive amounts of personal data are a source of 
market power for the biggest players in the global market for internet services.”).  
 119 Graef, supra note 78, at 10. 
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back loop” can lead to greater economies of scale. The “user feedback 
loop” theory presumes that as a platform gains more users it can collect 
more user data, leading to better insights into consumers and their needs, 
which the firm can use to improve quality and attract even more users.120 
The “monetization feedback loop” theory claims that as a platform gains 
more users and collects more user data, the firm is better able to target and 
sell ads, and so is better able to monetize its platform and gain revenues that 
can be invested in improving quality of service, thereby attracting more 
users.121  
Alongside these feedback loops, a number of distinct network effects 
come into play in online platforms that collect and use Big Data. Direct 
network effects occur when a product or service becomes more valuable to 
an individual user as more people use that particular product or service, 
such as in telecommunications networks or the electric grid. In a high tech 
context, social networking platforms, photo sharing platforms, and chat 
applications may enjoy significant direct network effects.122 Indirect net-
work effects occur when more users make the use of a product or service 
better or more attractive to consumers, though not because of direct interac-
tion between users. Search engines benefit from indirect network effects as 
more users allow the search engine to gain insight from user clicks into 
what users want, essentially learning by trial and error, and therefore im-
proving the quality of search results.123 
Some argue that network effects are particularly strong in two-sided 
platforms.124 A firm operating a two-sided platform can, it is argued, benefit 
from not only from traditional network effects, but also from cross platform 
network effects, where more users on one side of the platform makes the 
platform more attractive to users on the other side of the market.125 While 
entry barriers naturally vary from industry to industry, and indeed change 
over time, these practitioners suggest that the economies of scale and net-
work effects that characterize data-driven markets lead to a “winner takes 
all” result, and present insurmountable barriers to entry.126 
In reality, the strength of the feedback loop may be grossly overstated. 
The feedback loop theory assumes smaller rivals and challengers will not 
  
 120 Lerner, supra note 16, at 19. 
 121 Id. at 39. 
 122 See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424–26 (1985) (discussing direct and indirect network effects). 
 123 Lerner, supra note 16, at 10–11. 
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be able to compete effectively, as they lack comparable amounts of users, 
and therefore data, which inhibits their ability to improve quality and attract 
more users. As Lerner points out, however, these assumptions are “unsup-
ported by real-world evidence.”127 The economic characteristics of Big Data 
weaken the claimed strength of the feedback loop.128 Chief among these 
characteristics is the fact that online providers can gain scale in users in 
ways that do not involve user data, and that access to data alone is not 
enough to improve quality and gain scale in users.129 Additionally, firms can 
gather data from sources other than users (e.g. data brokers),130 and can gain 
scale in data in alternative ways, such as by entering into strategic distribu-
tion arrangements.131 In one such partnership between Microsoft and Yahoo 
regarding search results and advertising, the European Commission notes 
that “it is plausible that the merged entity through innovation and through 
its access to a larger index will be able to provide personalized search re-
sults better aligned to users' preferences.”132 
As to network effects, even in classic cases of direct network effects 
such as social networking and communications applications, innovation can 
be strong enough to upend the market, and network effects have time and 
time again proven insufficient to prevent newcomers from disrupting estab-
lished market leaders. In social networking for example, Friendster, the 
original “market leader” was replaced quickly by MySpace, which has now 
been rendered almost completely obsolete by Facebook. An innovative 
product is enough to cause users to switch, notwithstanding any network 
effect enjoyed by the incumbent.  
Among advertisers, network effects are diminished by the pricing 
structures employed by most online platforms, by advertiser multi-homing 
due to the low cost in advertising on multiple platforms, and by advertiser 
“congestion.”133 The pay-per-click model means that while advertising on a 
“busier” platform may result in better conversion rates for an advertiser, it 
also involves proportionally higher costs, and more clicks means the adver-
tiser has to pay more.134 As such, it may actually not be as economically 
advantageous for an advertiser to choose a larger online platform over a 
smaller one (contrary to real world platforms that are priced differently).135 
Additionally, since fixed costs to advertise on any particular platform are 
low, advertisers may be incentivized to advertise on multiple different plat-
  
 127 Lerner, supra note 16, at 20. 
 128 See Part II for a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of Big Data. 
 129 Lerner, supra note 16, at 28. 
 130 Id. at 8. 
 131 Id. at 28.  
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forms as opposed to putting all their eggs in one basket. Finally, while more 
users on a platform might be good for advertisers, more advertisers on the 
platform can actually be detrimental. Limited available space for online ads 
and competition for users’ attention means that advertisers may be better 
off on smaller platforms with less congestion.136 
Perhaps most importantly, cross platform network effects are also 
commonly overstated, and are actually one-sided. While advertisers cer-
tainly may flock to a search engine (or other online platform) with a strong 
user base with the hope of gaining more impressions and hopefully more 
conversions, users, on the other hand, do not choose a search engine based 
on a greater number of advertisements. This weakening of the cross plat-
form network effects argument in turn weakens the potential for a strong 
“feedback loop that locks users and advertisers to a dominant platform.”137 
If a smaller entrant offers a better product or service to users, users will 
switch, uninhibited by network effects, and advertisers will soon follow.138 
The above discussion demonstrates how the feedback loop is not as ef-
fective as suggested in gaining scale, but many commentators also misjudge 
the importance of scale. Big Data industries typically experience diminish-
ing returns of scale. Statistically, as Lerner illustrates, “the value of user 
data in returning relevant results to user search queries is subject to dimin-
ishing returns,” as the “advantages of scale weaken or even disappear at a 
low level.”139 While returns are greater for less frequent queries (known as 
“tail” queries), both large and small search providers are faced with queries 
they have never seen before on daily basis, where both small and large plat-
forms are at an equal disadvantage in delivering relevant results.140 Because 
of these rapidly diminishing returns, a larger provider may gain zero mar-
ginal value from incremental data after a certain point, and a smaller player 
may glean greater value from incremental data, incentivizing it to compete 
to attract users at the margin by investing in quality and innovation.141  
Even if scale is crucial to competitive success, smaller rivals do main-
tain both the ability and the incentive to compete.142 As to ability, many 
online players are well-funded, or at least have access to additional funding 
from investors, which they can use to improve quality and performance of 
their platform. Furthermore, all online players have access to stores of data 
from third parties, which is readily available and affordable, and can be 
deftly used to increase quality. As to incentive, economics tells us that in-
vestment incentive is based on marginal, not average effects. An investment 
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in quality by a smaller firm will attract more incremental users than a simi-
lar investment by a larger firm. As such, the smaller firm’s incentives to 
invest in quality may actually be greater than those of its larger rival. 
A final note on scale as a proxy for harm is articulated best by Lerner 
when he cautions that  
the mere existence of economies of scale does not, by itself, establish that large providers 
have monopoly power, that large providers have acted anticompetitively, or that consumers 
or competition have been harmed. Neither does the fact that there are economies of scale 
means that large online providers should be subject to greater antitrust scrutiny . . . . Regulat-
ing large firms simply because there are economies of scale would serve as a tax on competi-
tive success, distorting competition and harming consumers.143  
IV. IS ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT THE RIGHT WAY TO REGULATE BIG 
DATA? 
In order to consider whether antitrust is the most appropriate institu-
tional choice within which to explore, and potentially address, Big Data 
concerns, one should consider how antitrust case law has treated Big Data 
issues to date, how Big Data might fit within existing antitrust analysis 
framework or remedies, what legal or practical dangers might result from 
applying antitrust to Big Data, and whether an alternative framework is 
better suited to these issues. 
A. Case Law Does Not Support the Contention that Big Data Is an Anti-
trust Problem 
A thorough search of case law and agency actions reveals no case law 
on Big Data, nor have the antitrust agency consents ever affirmatively con-
cluded that consumer data constitutes a barrier to entry. While competition 
agencies and courts have concluded that data-related entry barriers may 
exist for the sale of data that cannot be sourced from consumers or big data 
marketplaces, they have yet to come to the same conclusion regarding data 
collected from consumers over the internet. Over the last five to ten years, 
antitrust agencies, and to a lesser extent the courts, have considered a num-
ber of mergers and instances of conduct involving potential theories of 
harm built around Big Data. One of the earliest examples of this was Goo-
gle’s acquisition of DoubleClick in 2007.144 At the time, both parties were 
large players in the market for search advertising—Google was a large on-
  
 143 Id. at 20. 
 144 Michael Baye et al., Economics at the FTC: The Google-DoubleClick Merger, Resale Price 
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line advertising intermediary, and DoubleClick was a leading online ad 
server. Both parties had vast stores of data relating to user search and 
browsing history. 
Both the FTC and the EC cleared the merger unconditionally, deciding 
that Google and DoubleClick were not close, actual, or potential competi-
tors in any markets for online advertising or services, and concluding that 
an incumbent’s access to user information was not a barrier to entry in on-
line advertising.145 Both authorities concluded that even if Google were to 
use DoubleClick’s user data in targeting advertisements, the data at issue 
was not an essential input to a successful online advertising product, and 
similar data of similar scope and quantity were available to rivals from 
other sources.146 The FTC stated that that the antitrust laws did not provide a 
basis to block or impose conditions on a merger purely to safeguard pri-
vacy.147 The FTC further concluded that harm to competition on privacy 
grounds was no more likely than harm to competition on price or other di-
mensions, and determined therefore that “privacy considerations, as such, 
do not provide a basis to challenge this transaction.”148 As briefly discussed 
earlier in this article, then Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour dissented 
from the Commission’s statement, arguing that the FTC forewent an oppor-
tunity to examine the effects of the merger on privacy as a form on non-
price competition.149 The European Commission’s evaluation of the merger 
focused solely on an analysis of competitive effects, and did not directly 
address privacy concerns.150 The EC stressed that its decision was without 
prejudice to the parties’ separate obligations under European data protec-
tion law.151  
Subsequently, in 2011 Google acquired ITA, an online electronic pric-
ing and shopping platform sold to comparison flight engines like Bing 
Travel, Kayak, and Orbitz.152 The Department of Justice considered data 
access as a potential vertical restraint in that case, and asked whether Goo-
gle would gain the incentive and ability to engage in data driven exclusion-
ary conduct that would foreclose its travel search rivals.153 Specifically, the 
Department of Justice asked whether Google would be able to degrade or 
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raise the cost of data, a necessarily input in its rivals’ platforms.154 Ulti-
mately, these issues were resolved with a consent decree requiring Google 
to continue licensing access to ITA’s system on fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory terms, and prohibiting Google from using consumer data for 
its own benefit.155  
Similarly, both the FTC and the European Commission examined 
Facebook’s 2014 acquisition of web-based messaging platform WhatsApp. 
Upon announcement of the transaction, several consumer groups com-
plained to the FTC that the transaction would bolster Facebook’s access to 
data which the company could monetize through advertising, contradicting 
prior statements by WhatsApp.156 The FTC cleared the transaction within 
two months, and sent a clear indication that the issues raised rested squarely 
within consumer protection law by sending a letter to the parties from the 
Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection reminding them of their 
continuing obligations under privacy law.157  
The European Commission also reviewed the Facebook/WhatsApp 
merger, and in doing so provided an analytical framework for exclusionary 
behavior in Big Data industries, ultimately clearing the transaction without 
conditions.158 While the Commission acknowledged that network effects 
could sometimes pose a barrier to entry in communications markets, it con-
cluded that this particular transaction was not likely to raise barriers to en-
try, noting “consumers can and do use multiple apps at the same time and 
can easily switch from one to another,”159 and adding that “‘there are cur-
rently a significant number of market participants that collect user data 
alongside Facebook,’ including Google, Apple, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, 
AOL, Yahoo, Twitter, IAC, LinkedIn, Adobe and Yelp.”160  
That investigation was significant, as it recognized the factual inexis-
tence of network effects as a barrier to entry in such a fast moving online 
market. The Commission based this conclusion on:  
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(1) The finding that messaging apps were a “fast-moving sector” with 
low switching costs, and therefore, “any leading market position even if 
assisted by network effects is unlikely to be incontestable;” 161   
(2) The finding that usage of one particular messaging app did not “ex-
clude the use of competing [messaging] apps by the same user;” in this con-
text, multi-homing was common and facilitated by the “ease of download-
ing a consumer communications app;”162 and  
(3) Acknowledgment that users of messaging apps “are not locked-in” 
to a given network.163  
The Commission found that even if Facebook were to begin collecting 
data from WhatsApp users, competitive harm would not result, as “there 
will continue to be a large amount of Internet user data that are valuable for 
advertising purposes and that are not within Facebook’s exclusive con-
trol.”164 The Commission’s decision also explicitly rejected the idea of con-
sidering a potential market for personal data in this case, citing the fact that 
the parties were not actually engaged in the sale of data to third parties.165   
In the US, there was a similar outcome with regard to the Niel-
sen/Arbitron merger,166 where the data was merely an input and the data 
itself was not for sale.167 Such cases where data is merely an input are dif-
ferent from cases where data is a market that firms sell to consumers.168  
Outside the merger context, the Federal Trade Commission’s 2011-
2012 investigation of Google centered at least partially on the competitive 
significance of data.169 In a recent statement responding to the inadvertently 
released of portions of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition Staff Report, 
Chairwoman Ramirez and Commissioners Brill and Ohlhausen noted that 
the Commission’s “exhaustive” investigation into Google’s internet search 
practices, including agreements for syndicated search and advertising serv-
ices were not, “on balance, demonstrably anticompetitive.”170 
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B. Big Data as Its Own Product Market 
Antitrust enforcement is also not suited to regulating Big Data due to 
the difficulty inherent in defining the relevant market for data. Market defi-
nition and market power still form the backbone of antitrust analysis under 
the current law. Some practitioners have suggested that data collection 
should form its own product market for the purpose of antitrust analysis.171 
The precise contours of such a market would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to define.  
In both the U.S. and Europe, substitution, via the hypothetical mo-
nopolist test, is an essential prerequisite to defining a market.172 The pri-
mary goal of defining a market is to measure a firm’s ability to exercise 
market power. The relevant market determines which goods or services 
potentially compete, to the exclusion of those that do not.173 Applying this 
determination to the advertising industry, we see that data itself is not a 
relevant product in the sale of online advertising. Advertising services are 
the relevant product. For the most part, online providers use data as an input 
in their service, as opposed to selling it as a product to consumers.174 There 
is, therefore, no competition between providers for the actual sale of data, 
and no substitution. As such, under current antitrust law, no relevant market 
can be defined for the collection of consumer data.175  
This was illustrated in the European Commission’s review of the 
Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition, where the Commission overtly declined 
to define a market for Big Data since neither party was active in the provi-
sion of data to third parties.176 The Commission explained that it “has not 
investigated any possible market definition with respect to the provision of 
data or data analytics services, since . . . neither of the Parties is currently 
active in any such potential markets.”177 Graef points out, however, that the 
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Commission’s rejection of personal data as a relevant market did not pre-
clude a review of concerns raised relating to the concentration of data as a 
result of this merger.178 
C. Consumer Protection Should Address Big Data Issues 
The laws of consumer protection and antitrust serve different goals, 
protect consumers from different harms, and operate via different spheres 
of the same agency.179 As Deborah Feinstein, head of the Bureau of Compe-
tition at the Federal Trade Commission explains, “any potential competition 
concerns would be distinct from the obligations either firm has to safeguard 
consumer privacy.”180 A recent review of the economics of privacy illus-
trates the complexity inherent in regulating privacy issues, but this review 
does not find a theoretical or empirical bases for using antitrust as a policy 
tool to address privacy concerns.181  
There have been a number of different suggested approaches for how 
and when antitrust regulators should intervene in Big Data or privacy is-
sues.182 One group advocates for a hybrid approach to policing Big Data, 
where the costs and benefits of consumer protection are balanced against 
the effect on competition where “conduct-distorting commerce implicates 
both consumer protection and competition principles.”183 In support of this 
approach, Harbour and Koslov have described the separation of competition 
and consumer protection as an “artificial dichotomy.”184  
Others suggest that because privacy protections constitute a form of 
non-price competition, regulators should apply antitrust principles to ana-
lyze privacy issues in a variety of different circumstances, such as when a 
merger might lead to reduced privacy competition,185 or where companies 
may mislead customers regarding data collection policies in order to gain 
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an unfair advantage or sustain dominance over competitors.186 However, 
other product elements such as product safety and efficacy also constitute 
forms of non-price competition, but are not primarily policed by the anti-
trust agencies. As Schepp and Wamback opine, “The most direct way to 
address worries about data protection and privacy is actually to tighten data 
protection law.”187 In this sense, institutional choice plays a role in how best 
to address a particular problem, and the optimal solution is to choose the 
institution best suited for this task.188 The antitrust laws’ only task is to 
maintain an environment within which products may compete, with the 
understanding that, as Ohlhausen and Okuliar put it, “competition is the 
best way to allocate resources in a free market.”189 The antitrust laws are not 
designed to address harms to privacy, but an efficient market, bolstered by 
the consumer protection laws, would provide adequate protection from 
those harms, with each legal area (antitrust and consumer protection) using 
their distinct institutional competencies to promote increased consumer 
welfare. 
Consumer protection is an effective way to address issues of pri-
vacy.190 There are a number of existing methods that govern how the FTC 
regulates privacy on the consumer protection side and does so relatively 
effectively.191 Suggested safeguards intended to prevent the misuse of Big 
Data by a dominant firm, such as enabling the consumer to more easily 
select privacy preferences or to identify providers that match their privacy 
preferences, sit squarely within the remit of the consumer protection agen-
cies.192 Where an “imbalance of power” between users and online firms 
leads to diminished data portability, individual consumers or competitors 
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might suffer,193 but the mechanics of data collection is not for the antitrust 
laws to govern. Antitrust law is only a suitable choice where there is harm 
to competition— its role is not to fill gaps in the privacy laws.  
In its decision clearing the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, the European 
Commission also underscored the importance of appropriate institutional 
choice in addressing the harms explored in this article, noting, “Any pri-
vacy-related concerns flowing from the increased concentration of data 
within the control of Facebook as a result of the Transaction do not fall 
within the scope of the EU competition law rules but within the scope of the 
EU data protection rules.”194 
1. Are Antitrust Remedies Appropriate? 
Some have suggested that antitrust remedies may be appropriate where 
a dominant firm has misused Big Data to gain or sustain an improper com-
petitive advantage.195 The imposition of such remedies presents obvious 
problems. From an antitrust perspective, forced sharing of information with 
rivals infers the essential facilities doctrine,196 and such forced dealing with 
competitors in the Big Data environment is far beyond the limits of what a 
duty to deal would require,197 and may improperly skew competitive incen-
tives. As Tucker and Wellford, quoting the Supreme Court in Trinko,198 
remind us, compelling firms “to share the source of their advantage is in 
some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may 
lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those 
economically beneficial facilities.”199 If Big Data were deemed an essential 
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facility and a duty to deal imposed, the competitive dynamics of the market 
would be dramatically altered.200 Such an extreme and far-reaching remedy 
is out of line with current antitrust policy.201 
Practically speaking, requiring affirmative user consent before data is 
collected may detract from the user experience and lessen quality. Simi-
larly, prohibiting or restricting data collection may stifle innovation and 
present users with lower quality services; and divestiture or separation of 
distinct product lines may also stifle innovation and hinder a firm’s ability 
to offer personalized services.202  
Antitrust remedies haphazardly applied to the collection and use of 
consumer data may not only harm competition, but also may in fact raise 
separate, legitimate, privacy issues.203 Antitrust remedies may also create 
privacy concerns, as they would require data to be shared among rival firms 
even though consumers have not consented to their data being used in this 
way.204 Likewise, a forced sharing of data could violate a company’s al-
ready existing consent decrees with the FTC.205 
The FTC, in the Closing Statement from its investigation into the 
Google/DoubleClick merger, rejected the notion that antitrust remedies 
should be imposed to address privacy harms: 
[T]he sole purpose of federal antitrust review of mergers and acquisitions is to identify and 
remedy transactions that harm competition. Not only does the Commission lack legal author-
ity to require conditions to this merger that do not relate to antitrust, regulating the privacy 
requirements of just one company could itself pose a serious detriment to competition in this 
vast and rapidly evolving industry.206  
Difficulty in administering such remedies also counsels against their appli-
cation. Informing consumers of the intricate details of data collection can 
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actually be misleading to consumers, and result in more confusion.207 Firms 
may legitimately be unable to adequately inform a consumer at the outset of 
how exactly the firm will use their data.208 As with all remedies, the agen-
cies and the courts will not, and should not, want to become too involved in 
specifically shaping the minutiae of a firm’s data sharing policies, which 
presents even further administrative issues.209 
2. Practical and Legal Dangers of Antitrust Intervention 
Using antitrust as a sword to address Big Data concerns risks reducing 
competition and innovation from new products.210 Antitrust enforcement 
agencies are well advised to proceed cautiously in areas of rapid innovation, 
in order to avoid stifling competition and the natural unfolding of the mar-
ketplace. As Lerner puts it, “Antitrust intervention in markets characterized 
by innovation and rapid technological change is often a questionable propo-
sition, but it is especially so when concerns are based on supported assump-
tions rather than fact-based inquiry.”211 While an industry is in its relative 
infancy, it can be difficult to distinguish between procompetitive innovation 
and changes that are designed to (or actually do) stifle competition. Even in 
established markets, antitrust should never be used as a replacement for 
sound business judgment. As the FTC’s closing statement in the Google 
investigation explained, “Challenging Google’s product design decisions in 
this case would require the Commission—or a court—to second-guess a 
firm’s product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifica-
tions have been offered, and where those justifications are supported by 
ample evidence.”212 
Consumer welfare is enhanced most dramatically by “leapfrog” com-
petition, as opposed to incremental improvements. It is crucial that the anti-
trust laws cultivate and maintain an environment in which robust and rapid 
innovation is not only possible, but also incentivized. A paternalistic ap-
proach to Big Data will neither cultivate nor maintain such an environment, 
and may instead lead to stagnation and fear among platform providers. 
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CONCLUSION 
This literature review suggests that antitrust law is ill-suited to police 
Big Data and its use by online firms. The empirical case for regulating Big 
Data as an antitrust concern is still lacking.213 Further, from a theoretical 
perspective, not enough work has yet been done to thoughtfully study and 
analyze how antitrust could, or should, be applied to specific issues involv-
ing Big Data. In fact, the lack of empirical evidence, robust theories, or, 
indeed, legal precedent suggests that there is no cause for concern in this 
arena with regard to antitrust law and Big Data. All that is available at pre-
sent are general theories of exclusion applied to this new area. Until anti-
trust authorities can match theories of harm with specific factual circum-
stances and show negative competitive harm to consumers, the antitrust 
case against Big Data is a weak one. The existing theories of harm conflict 
with the realities of Big Data (e.g., non-rivalrous, ubiquitous, low barriers 
to entry noted above) and consumer online behavior (e.g., multi-homing).214 
And while the case is weak, and the theories uncertain, antitrust authorities 
should proceed with caution. Antitrust intervention over market forces 
threatens consumer welfare, especially is fast moving markets, and pro-
posed remedies, such as limiting the collection and use of Big Data or forc-
ing large firms to share with rivals, are likely to harm competition and in-
novation, and in fact may raise privacy concerns. 
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